We provide strong evidence from multiple tests that credit lines (CLs) play special roles in syndicated loan packages. We find that CLs are associated with lower interest rate spreads on institutional term loans (ITLs) in the same loan packages. CLs also help improve secondary market liquidity of ITLs. These effects are robust to within-firm-year analysis. Using Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as a quasi-natural experiment further confirms our conclusions. These findings support the Bank Specialness Hypothesis that banks play valuable roles in alleviating information problems and that CLs are one conduit for this specialness.
Introduction
A significant share of bank lending has moved from the originate-to-hold (OTH) model to the originate-to-distribute (OTD) syndicated loan model. Over 1996 to 2016, U.S. large public companies raised on average $670.75 billion per year from the syndicated loans market. 1 Syndicated loans constitute 54.67% of all long-term debt financing for large firms that issue longterm debt and syndicated loans. Many institutional investors, such as collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), loan mutual funds, hedge funds, and insurance companies participate in this market.
The shift from the OTH to the OTD model raises the important issue of whether "bank specialness" continues to prevail on the syndicated loan market. If banks are still special, are there particular type(s) of financial instrument in this market through which "bank specialness" is conveyed? Financial intermediation theory emphasizes the specialness of banks in alleviating asymmetric information problems between informationally opaque borrowers and banks (e.g., Diamond (1984) , Fama (1985) ). Specifically, under the Bank Specialness Hypothesis, banks have comparative advantages in uncovering valuable private information about borrowers through 1) screening before credits are issued, 2) monitoring after credits are disbursed, and 3) accumulating additional information over the course of relationships in which banks may provide additional loan, deposit, and other financial services to the borrowers. Under the Bank Specialness Hypothesis, informationally opaque borrowers may be able to obtain greater quantities of credit at more favorable terms because the private information acquired by the banks helps resolve uncertainty and mitigate agency problems associated with asymmetric information. 1 The annual issuance amount is the sum of all credit lines and term loans issued by U.S. non-financial and non-utility firms on Compustat with positive total assets in each calendar year. Loan issuance data comes from DealScan. Nevertheless, it is also possible that bank specialness may not apply as much to the modern syndicated loans market for several reasons. First, most syndicated loan borrowers are relatively large and informationally transparent, so there may be little private information to gather. Second, technological advancements may have made it easier for nonbanks to gather and process information, reducing bank comparative advantages. Third, bank specialness may be less likely to hold in the OTD lending process. When so many other parties are involved in the OTD lending process, it is questionable whether the lead banks that initiate the loans have sufficient incentives to invest in the private information production that makes banks special. That is, lead banks may not gather much private information because many of the benefits of the information acquisition may go to the syndicate participants that buy most of the credits (e.g., Wang and Xia (2014) ).
While some syndicated lending research suggests that lead banks do generate private information on the borrowers (e.g., Sufi (2007) , Gutierrez-Mangas, Ivanov, Lueck, Luo, and Nichols (2015) , Balasubramanyan, Berger, and Koepke (2017) ), this research does not directly address the bank specialness issue.
In this paper, we devise new tests of bank specialness in the OTD model and shed light on the importance of loan structure to maintain this specialness. Existing empirical investigations of the Bank Specialness Hypothesis typically test whether abnormal stock market returns to bank loan announcements are positive, i.e., whether the market values the private information gathered by the banks. The empirical evidence is mixed, with some supporting specialness (e.g., Mikkelson and Partch (1986) , James (1987) , Lummer and McConnell (1989) , Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) , Gande and Saunders (2012) ), and others finding either no specialness or that results differ by borrower type, loan type, or time period (e.g., Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2006) , Bailey, Huang, and Yang (2011) , Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) , Li and Ongena (2015) , Saheruddin (2017) ). The results of these announcement effect papers may be noisy because the abnormal returns must be estimated. In addition, the findings may be subject to sample selection bias because the choice of which loans the parties choose to announce may be biased (e.g., Maskara and Mullineaux (2011), Saheruddin (2017) ).
In our paper, rather than relying on the measurement of abnormal stock returns to loan announcements that may be noisy and biased by the selection of which loans are announced, we use data on primary market loan interest rate spreads and secondary market liquidity of the loans. 2 We specifically examine institutional term loans (ITLs) -term loans below A (i.e., B, C, D, E., etc.) and those being labeled simply as "term loan" with "bullet" payment schedules (entire loan amount is paid at maturity) -that are usually financed by institutional (i.e., nonbank) investors (e.g., Gatev and Strahan (2009) , Ivashina and Sun (2011) ). We focus on ITLs as oppose to other syndicated loans in order to have a clean distinction between the lead banks that originate the loans and the nonbank institutions that participate in these loans. Other syndicated loans more often have other banks as most of the participants. 3 We examine the reaction of the interest rate spreads and the secondary market liquidity of the ITLs to whether revolving bank credit lines (CLs) -credits that may be drawn down and repaid at the borrowers' discretion -coexist in the same loan packages. 4 Our empirical designs are motivated by theories and empirical evidence suggesting that CLs provide special value to solve information problems in lending. Specifically, the structure of CLs allows banks to elicit private information to mitigate agency problems (e.g., Boot, Thakor, 2 Throughout the paper, a loan is a facility. 3 ITLs are growing much faster than other syndicated loans and are priced at a premium relative to other loans (e.g., Ivashina and Sun (2011) , Lim, Minton, and Weisbach (2014) , Nini (2016) ). 4 When ITLs and CLs are in the same loan package, it is almost always the case that both loans have the same lead bank. In our sample, 94.1% of ITLs have the same lead bank as in the CLs in the same package.
and Udell (1987 Udell ( , 1991 , Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) ). CLs also incentivize banks to continue to monitor the borrowers as the bank can revoke or alter the terms of borrowers' access to funding (e.g., using covenants or material adverse change clauses) when it is exposed to the borrower performance problems or misbehavior (e.g., Rajan and Winton (1995) , Sufi (2009), Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez (2014) ). Theories suggests that a lead bank will monitor the borrower and produce information more intensively if it supplies a CL simultaneously with an ITL. CLs can also generate valuable information that banks use in managing their lending relationships (Norden and Weber (2010)). As well, CLs are embodiments of bank-borrower relationships, given that the bank trusts the borrower to decide when future loans are issued. As an illustration of these relationships, it is found that business borrowers tend to cluster their CLs in a single bank much more often than other loan types (Berger and Udell (1995) We also use a new loan trading database to study the effect of having CLs on the secondary market liquidity of ITLs. The evidence also supports the Bank Specialness Hypothesis. ITLs bundled with CLs have more liquid secondary markets than stand-alone ITLs with 9-15 basis points lower bid-ask spreads. This implies a reduction in a round-trip trading costs for a $100 million position in a loan of an economically significant $90,000 to $150,000. These two findings -reduced spread and improved secondary market liquidity -are mutually consistent. Existing research suggests that investors require lower interest spreads for loans with better secondary market liquidity as measured by lower bid-ask spreads (Amihud and Mendelson (1986) ).
It is important to point out that, in establishing our results, we address potential endogeneity in several ways. The inclusion of a CL in a loan package may be endogenous (e.g., Sufi (2009)), and/or important firm characteristics could be omitted. First, in our primary market interest rate and secondary market liquidity regressions, we both use the firm-by-year fixed effects to wash out the potential impact of borrower demand factors. The firm-by-year fixed effects essentially allow us to compare the primary market pricing and the secondary market liquidity of an ITL bundled with a CL with a stand-alone ITL by the same borrower during the same year. Thus, the lower spread and lower bid-ask spread are unlikely to be driven by omitted borrower factors. Second, while primary market loan spreads and loan structure could be simultaneously determined at loan inception, the secondary market liquidity of a loan is measured over time after 6 As shown later, the secondary market liquidity results are also robust even if we use the firm-by-month fixed effects.
the loan is issued. Our regressions of secondary market liquidity should therefore be less affected by any simultaneity bias. The secondary market liquidity results are also robust when we restrict attention to a subsample of loans that are traded over the first year of loan trading. Specifically, we test the effects of CLs on ITL spreads, the effects of CLs on secondary market liquidity ITLs, and we gather corroborating evidence from the natural experiment of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy to show that specialness ends with the demise of the bank issuing the CL. All three of these methodologies provide support for the hypothesis.
Relately, we show that CLs serve as one conduit for banks to perform their special information production roles. We provide evidence on the distinctive qualities of CLs as information-gathering devices, monitoring tools, and bank-borrower relationship enhancers. This adds to the theoretical and empirical work cited above about the key roles of CLs in solving information problems (Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Acharya et al. (2014) ).
Finally, our results inform the loan contracting literature. Including CLs in loan packages with ITLs has benefits for several economic agents. Borrowers achieve lower loan spreads on their
ITLs, gain sources of liquidity through the CLs, and may attain additional future relationship advantages in terms of improved credit availability, lower spreads, and reduced collateral requirements (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Berger and Udell (1995) ). Lead banks may reap rewards from reduced agency problems associated with asymmetric information. Syndicated loan market participants may gain from greater secondary market liquidity and lower trading costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data and sample characteristics. Sections 3, 4, and 5 show the primary market spread test results, secondary market liquidity findings, and the Lehman bankruptcy natural experiment outcomes, respectively.
Section 6 provides conclusions.
Data and Sample Characteristics
We extract data from the LPC DealScan dataset between 1994 and 2016. As described above, an ITL is a term loan B or below or a general term loan with a "bullet" payment schedule.
(e.g., Nadauld and Weisbach (2012) The difference of bid-ask spread between these two loan types is statistically significant at the 5% level, consistent with the Bank Specialness Hypothesis prediction that the existence of CL in a package improves loan liquidity.
We also report the primary market characteristics of traded loans in Table 2 Panel C.
Compared with the sample of 3,007 ITLs in Table 2 Panel A, the traded loans tend to be larger in size, longer in maturity, and more investors at the time of closing. It is not surprising that larger loans with more investors are more likely to be traded on the secondary market. We note that, however, sample selection bias is not likely a significant concern for our analysis. 
Primary Market Tests of the Bank Specialness Hypothesis
We present a number of tests to determine if interest rate spreads of ITLs in the primary market are lower when they are bundled with CLs, controlling for other factors, as predicted by the Bank Specialness Hypothesis. We show baseline regressions of these spreads on a CL indicator (Subsection 3.1), test whether the effects are stronger when there is greater information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender and greater need for information production (Subsection 3.2), provide additional tests with different specifications and samples (Subsection 3.3), and test whether the effects are driven by alternative explanations (Subsection 3.4). In all cases, the results are consistent with the hypothesis, and are statistically and economically significant.
Baseline Results
To test the hypothesis, we estimate versions of the following model:
where i indexes the ITL, j indexes the borrowing firm, k indexes the lead bank, and t indexes the year the ITL is issued. Each observation is an individual ITL. The key independent variable is CL Indicator, which equals one if the ITL has a CL in the same package and zero otherwise. We control for a variety of borrower and loan characteristics whenever applicable. In different specifications, we control various fixed effects, including firm, year, firm-by-year, loan purpose, lead bank, and bank-by-year fixed effects to address different sources of potential bias.
9
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the borrower level.
We report baseline results in Table 3 . In Column (1) have stand-alone ITLs appear to have better credit profiles in that they are larger, have more tangible assets, and are more likely to have credit ratings, to mitigate any bias from time-varying unobserved factors, we estimate a more rigorous firm-by-year fixed effects models, similar to the treatment in Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2012), Paligorova and Santos (2016), and Beck, Ioannidou, and Schafer (2017) . Essentially, we compare the outcomes of different ITLs taken by the same firm during the same year, effectively washing out borrower heterogeneity. 9 We follow Ivashina (2009) to identify the lead bank of a facility. Specifically, if an administrative agent of a facility is identified, it is defined as the lead bank. If the syndicate does not have an administrative agent, lenders carrying the titles of agent, arranger, book-runner, lead arranger, lead bank, or lead manager are defined as the lead bank. In case there are multiple defined lead banks, we assign the lead role to the one with largest loan share. Table 3 Columns (2) to (4) report the firm-by-year fixed effects model estimation results.
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Firm characteristics drop out of these regressions because they do not vary for the same firm in the same year. The observation number in each regression shows the actual observation used in the firm-by-year fixed effects estimation. Column (2) shows a parsimonious model in which other loan contract terms are excluded since they could be simultaneously determined with the spread.
CL Indicator again carries a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Column (3) includes all loan characteristics, and the CL Indicator coefficient remains negative and is statistically significant at the 5% level. In both models, the point estimates and the economic magnitudes of the coefficients on CL Indicator are larger than in Column (1), implying reductions of 80 bps and 38 bps, respectively, in the loan spread when a CL is bundled with an ITL.
We next deal with lender heterogeneity, which can also affect spreads. For example, banks with stronger balance sheets tend to charge lower rates (e.g., Santos (2011)). In Column (4) we report result using firm-by-year fixed effects and lead bank fixed effects. The coefficient on CL Indicator still has a negative sign and is statistically significant, suggesting that our findings are unlikely to be driven by time-invariant lead bank heterogeneity.
In Column (5), we estimate a bank-by-year fixed effects model. We do this for two reasons.
First, using bank-by-year fixed effects allows us to insulate our estimation result from the impact of any bank characteristics since we compare two different ITLs originated by the same bank in the same year. Secondly, while just a handful of firms would borrow two or more loans in one year, it is more common for a bank to originate two or more loans per year. It is therefore difficult to attribute the estimation results to sample selection bias. The estimated coefficient on CL Indicator remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on CL Indicator in Column in (5) is also in line with the other results.
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Taken together, the baseline results in Table 3 suggest that an ITL bundled with a CL has a statistically significant lower interest spread than a stand-alone ITL, all else equal. Economically, the inclusion of a CL implies a reduction of 27 -80 bps of the spread. These results strongly support the Bank Specialness Hypothesis and are unlikely to be driven by omitted borrower or bank characteristics.
Differential Effects of CLs with Different Information Environments
To the extent the Bank Specialness Hypothesis holds -and CLs are associated with more lead bank information production -the effects of CLs in reducing All-in-Drawn Spread of bundled ITLs should be greater when the need for information production by the lead banks is more important. We test this implication of the hypothesis using five information problem proxies. In each case, we rerun the All-in-Drawn Spread regressions adding on the right hand side Information Problem Proxy and its interaction with the CL Indicator, where Information Problem Proxy is a dummy for a loan in which information problems are likely to be relatively more serious. Thus, we estimate regressions of the form:
We carry out five tests in this subsection. The first two information problem proxies capture the informational opacity of the borrowing firm -more opaque borrowers require more information production. The last three proxies indicate information deficits that the lead bank must overcome in producing information on the borrower. Table 4 shows regression results when we include these information proxies as well as their interaction effects with CL Indicator. For each proxy, we report two regressions, one with firm and year fixed effects and one with firm-by-year fixed effects. When firm-by-year fixed effects are included, the un-interacted information proxy will be absorbed thus omitted if it does not vary within a firm-year cell.
In Table Columns (1) and (2), the proxy is for firms without a public debt rating, taken from Compustat. The literature suggests that non-rated borrowers are subject to greater asymmetric information problems (e.g., Sufi (2007) , Chava and Roberts (2008)). In both columns, the interaction term between CL Indicator and Non-Rated Firm Dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, supporting the Bank Specialness Hypothesis.
We next differentiate between small and large firms. Small firms tend be more informationally opaque (e.g., Hadlock and Pierce (2010)). Columns (3) and (4) report estimation results with interactions of CL Indicator with Small Firm Dummy, which equals one if its total assets are below median. Consistent with the Bank Specialness Hypothesis, the coefficients on the interaction terms in both Columns (3) and (4) are negative and statistically significant.
In Columns (5) and (6), we differentiate firms by whether they have prior lending relationships with the lead bank, which are found in the literature to help reduce informational asymmetries between the bank and borrower (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Berger and Udell (1995) Credit Line Indicator in both Columns (7) and (8) (9) and (10), we find a stronger effect of CLs for small syndicates.
Robustness Tests for the Primary Market Results
We report several robustness tests on the impact of bundled CLs in the primary market in Table 5 . We show that the baseline results hold with additional control variables, with different samples, and under alternative measures of key dependent and independent variable.
In Column (1), we include two additional controls for loan characteristics: Sponsored Loan and Refinancing Loan, indicating if the loan has a financial sponsor and is a refinancing deal, respectively. We control for the presence of financial sponsor in case having a CL might be related to the financial sponsor. The results are robust to including these controls.
In Column (2), we control for the bundling of a Term Loan A (TLA) in a loan package.
TLAs are amortizing term loans that are often syndicated to banks instead of non-bank institutional investors. To ensure the documented effect of CLs on ITL interest spreads is not driven by another bank term loan in the same package, we include a dummy variable TLA Indicator, indicating if a deal also has a TLA. The results remain intact, suggesting that bank specialness only transmits through credit line rather than other bank funded term loans.
In Column (3), we control the presence of an existing loan to the same borrower from the same lead bank of ITL. Specifically, the Existing Loan Indicator is equal to 1 if there was a previous loan issued to the same borrower originated by the same lead bank and the loan has not reached to its maturity yet. The Existing Loan Indicator alone has negative effect on ITL spread, consistent with a reduction of information asymmetry if the lead bank lend to the borrower before.
Moreover, the effect of CL Indicator remains robust.
In Column (4), we use a broader sample. In addition to the 3,007 observations of Term Loan B/below and those unranked "bullet" term loans, we include other unranked term loans that do not have bullet payment schedules. For this larger sample of 5,910 ITLs, the coefficient on CL Indicator is still negative and statistically significant at the 1% level with a similar magnitude.
In Column (5), we show that bundled CL has a similar significant negative effect on ITL spread if we include non-Compustat firms in the sample, although the magnitude of coefficient estimate drops a little. This is not surprising since having non-Compustat firms in the sample potentially introduces bias as we lack necessary information to control for a borrower's incorporation country, industry, and organization structure. For example, financial firms may use CLs much differently than manufacturing firms do. Nonetheless, we show that our baseline results, estimated from a more homogenous sample, are not simply an outcome of selection.
In Column (6), we test an alternative specification of our key independent variable, replacing CL Indicator with a continuous measure, CL Portion of Package. Consistent with the Bank Specialness Hypothesis, this continuous measure is significantly negatively associated with ITL spreads. In Column (7), we use the All-in-Drawn Spread level instead of its natural log as the dependent variable. The coefficient on the CL Indicator is again negative and economically and statistically significant, suggesting that our results are robust to the functional form of the dependent variable. In an unreported test, we also find that the effect of credit lines is not affected by credit line purposes.
Credit Line Bundling and Investor Demand
Another potential concern is that if investors' demand for an ITL simply differs due to CL bundling, the CL Indicator can capture investor demand instead of bank specialness. Recent studies suggest that syndicated loan pricing responds to shocks to investor capital and demand for loans (e.g., Ivashina and Sun (2011), Lim, Minton, and Weisbach (2014) , Nadauld and Weisbach (2012) ). We next present several tests that suggest that the demand-side factors are not related to CL bundling and thus are unlikely to explain our results.
We test whether bundled ITLs experience higher investor demand than stand-alone ITLs on average. Following Ivashina and Sun (2011), we first use time-on-market (TOM), the number of days that a loan remains unsubscribed after launch, as a proxy for investor demand. 12 Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 6 report regression results using Log (TOM) as the dependent variable. 13 We find that the coefficient on CL Indicator is insignificant under both model specifications, suggesting that there is no significant difference between investor's demand for stand-alone ITLs and bundled ITLs.
Our second measure of investor demand is the probability of being traded on the secondary market. We estimate conditional logit models (i.e. fixed-effects logit models that include firm-byyear fixed effects) in Columns (3) and (4). Because these estimations could be subject to the incidental parameters problem, in Column (5) and (6), we also estimate a conventional logit model without fixed effects and a linear probability model with fixed effects, respectively. All models yield similar results: The CL Indicator does not exhibit any statistical significance, suggesting that there exist no significant differences in the likelihood of being traded between bundled and standalone ITLs. Nonetheless, we caution against drawing overly strong conclusions from insignificant results such as those in Table 6 because they could alternatively reflect a lack of test power.
Secondary Market Tests of the Bank Specialness Hypothesis
We next provide novel evidence on bank specialness from the secondary loan market by examining how bundling an ITL with a CLs affects trading liquidity. The secondary market quoted bid and ask price information of syndicated loans is obtained from Thomson Reuter Mark-to- 12 We extract this information from DealScan. Our regression sample becomes smaller due to the availability of this data item. On average, the time-on-market in our sample is 26.28 days. This is in line with Ivashina and Sun (2011), whose sample mean is 26.41 days. 13 The Secured Loan dummy is dropped from Column (2) of Table 6 because all loans with TOM information are secured.
Market database. To find out secondary market trading information of ITLs, we match loans in the secondary market database with loans in the DealScan. We then use the bid-ask spread of a traded ITL to measure its liquidity. We follow the literature that suggests that a reduction in information asymmetry leads to lower bid-ask spreads for a traded security (Kyle (1985) , Easley and O'Hara (1987) ), and the recent literature that suggests that information environment affects the bid-ask spread of a loan (e.g., Wittenberg-Moerman (2008), Santos and Shao (2017) ). The Bank Specialness Hypothesis predicts that an ITL bundled with a CL has a smaller bid-ask spread than a stand-alone ITL, reflecting the reduced informational asymmetry due to CL bundling.
Specifically, we estimate the following regression using the secondary market bid-ask spread as the dependent variable:
In the above equation, i indexes the ITL, j indexes the borrowing firm, k indexes the lead bank, and t indexes the trading year or month. 14 Table 7 reports the estimated effects of a bundled CL secondary market liquidity of ITLs. In Columns (1) and (2), we employ the firm-by-year fixed effects regression model to compare secondary market trading characteristics of ITLs with and without bundled CLs, holding borrower characteristics constant. Column (1) reports result from a model without some loan characteristics while Column (2) reports result from a model with all loan characteristics controls. In Columns (1) and (2), we include all ITL-trading year observations, while in Column (3) we also report the results using only the first trading year of all loans because 14 In addition to all the control variables used in the primary market regressions in Table 3 , we further include Loan Age, which indicates number of years from current trading year to loan issuance year, to control for the "on-the-run" liquidity phenomenon in fixed income markets. In an unreported test, we also use Log (1+bid-ask spread) as the dependent variable and the results are similar.
of the possibility that loans traded for a long time may be inherently different and some loans may have be refinanced or prepaid along the way. In Column (4), we again use all ITL-trading year observations and apply an even tighter firm-by-month fixed effects model. In Column (5), we control for the lead bank fixed effects. In Column (6), we further control for time-varying bank characteristics by using a bank-by-year fixed effects model.
The coefficients on the CL Indicator in Columns (1) through (6) are all negative, and are statistically significant. The lower bid-ask spread is unlikely to be explained by borrower characteristics since we have firm-by-year fixed effects that effectively allows us to hold these characteristics constant. Moreover, the firm-by-month fixed effects model (in Column (4)) also yields similar estimation results. This specification controls even more tightly for borrower characteristics, which are very unlikely to change much within a just one-month period. The results are also robust using bank-by-year fixed effects (in Column (6)), which suggests that the impact on bundled CL on ITL bid-ask spread cannot be attributed to omitted bank characteristics.
The negative coefficients in Columns (1) through (6) suggest that, all else equal, an ITL with a bundled CL trades in a narrower bid-ask spread than a stand-alone ITL. The range of coefficients from -0.08 to -0.23 suggests that the bid-ask spread of a loan with a bundled CL is on average 8 to 23 bps lower, which implies an economically significant saving of $80,000 to $230,000 in round-trip trading costs for a $100 million position.
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Together, the results in Table 7 lend further support to the Bank Specialness Hypothesis.
The findings also suggest that informed investors/traders tend to improve information efficiency in the secondary loan market overall. Our results add to recent findings by Bushman, Smith, and 15 The average size of bundled ITL with secondary market information is $455.75 million ( 19 In unreported tests, we leave out firm characteristics controls since the borrower itself could be affected by Lehman bankruptcy and the associated loss of CL (Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012) , Roberts and Whited (2013) In Columns (3) and (4), we report the DiD estimation results with added firm fixed effects.
Adding firm fixed effects may reduce the degree of freedom in the test but allows us to control for the permanent difference between firms with Lehman CLs and firms with CLs from other banks.
In Column (3), the coefficient on Post 2008*Lehman CL is still positive yet becomes statistically insignificant. In Column (4), when we specifically control for Lehman ITL and Post 2008*Lehman ITL, the DiD estimator regains its statistical significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient is also in line with the previous columns.
In Columns (5) and (6) November 14, 2008 , Case No. 08-13555, Docket No. 1541 (the "LCPI Assumption Motion"). 21 The results are similar if we use 1-nearest or 2-nearst neighbors PSM matching.
treatment effect is less likely to be explained by borrower differences. In Columns (5) and (6), the coefficients on Post 2008*Lehman CL is all positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, again suggesting that the exogenous shock to the access to Lehman CLs has an adverse effect on the secondary market liquidity of ITLs.
Economically, the results in Table 7 imply that Lehman bankruptcy leads to a sizable increase of bid-ask spread of affected ITLs by 22 to 26 basis points, which are more than 20% of the average bid-ask spread (0.96% for bundled ITLs, as reported in Panel C of Table 2 ).
Conclusions
We create novel tests of the Bank Specialness Hypothesis using primary and secondary market data on credit lines (CLs) and institutional term loans (ITLs) from the syndicated loan market. We test whether the inclusion of a credit line (CL) in the same loan package as an ITL reduces the ITL interest rate spread and improves its secondary market liquidity. The findings are strongly consistent with the hypothesis, and are robust to the within firm-year specification and to an additional test using the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as a natural experiment. In addition to supporting bank specialness, the findings also suggest that CLs are one conduit through which this specialness is implemented.
The primary market tests have advantages over the usual tests of bank specialness in the literature using abnormal stock market returns around the times of bank announcements. The interest rate spreads do not have to be estimated, eliminating the noise associated with estimating abnormal stock returns. We are also able to avoid any sample selection bias associated with whether the loans are announced. The secondary market tests of loan liquidity and the natural 26 experiment of the Lehman bankruptcy are novel and do not have analogs in the literature. The finding that all three of our test methodologies consistently and robustly support the Bank Specialness Hypothesis is also a strength of the paper.
Our tests also extend the literature on the distinctive value of CLs in the lending process.
These types of loans are associated with strong monitoring incentives. They are also embodiments of bank-borrower relationships that are associated with reduced informational asymmetries.
Finally, our findings may have implications for optimal loan contracting. The inclusion of a CL in a loan package with an ITL benefits the borrower with lower loan spreads and greater liquidity, and with possible future benefits in terms of improved credit availability and better terms on subsequent loans. Such arrangements may also reward the lead banks with fewer agency problems from informational asymmetries. The secondary market participants in these loans may gain from greater liquidity and lower trading costs of the loans. 
Facility Amount ($ million)
The total amount of the loan facility in millions of dollars DealScan Performance Pricing Indicator A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the loan facility has a pricing grid, zero otherwise DealScan Prior Lending Relationship A borrower's prior lending relationship with the lead arranger. The lending relationship is calculated as the ratio of the total dollar amount of loans borrowed by the firm and arranged by the lead arranger in the past five years scaled by the total dollar amount of loans borrowed by the firm (regardless of lead arrangers)
DealScan

Number of Lenders
The total number of different lenders in the loan facility DealScan
Number of Financial Covenants
The total number of financial covenants in the package DealScan
Facility Maturity
The stated maturity of the loan facility in months DealScan Secured Loan A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the loan facility is secured by collateral DealScan Sponsored Loan A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the loan facility has a financial sponsor DealScan Refinancing Loan A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the loan facility is a refinancing deal DealScan A firm's book leverage ratio, defined as the sum of total debt in current liabilities (dlc) and total long-term debt (dltt) over the firm's total assets (at)
Compustat
Cash Holdings A firm's total cash and short-term investments (che) over the firm's total assets (at) Compustat Tangibility A firm's total property, plant and equipment (ppent) over the firm's total assets (at) Compustat ROA A firm's net income (ni) over the firm's total assets (at) Compustat Rated Dummy A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the borrower has a S&P long-term credit rating, zero otherwise Compustat
Bank Leverage Ratio Bank Tier1 capital (RCFD8274) over total assets (RCFD2170) Call Report Bank Loan Loss Allowance
Bank loan loss allowance (RCFD3123) over total assets (RCFD2170) Call Report
Bank Size Natural log of bank total assets (RCFD2170) in thousands of dollars Call Report Table 2 Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests
We report the summary statistics for institutional term loans (ITLs) and borrowing firms in our sample and the univariate tests of the differences between stand-alone and bundled ITLs. In Panel A we report the summary statistics and the univariate tests of the differences of loan characteristics between stand-alone and bundled ITLs. ITLs include term loans below A (i.e., B, C, D, E., etc.) and those being labeled simply as "term loan" with "bullet" payment schedules. Our ITL sample consists of 3,007 loans issued between 1994 and 2016 by U.S. non-financial and non-utility firms with non-missing regression variables. In Panel B, we report the summary statistics and the univariate tests of the differences of borrowing firm characteristics of these 3,007 loans. In Panel C we report the summary statistics and the univariate tests of the differences of characteristics of 1,614 ITLs (as a subsample of the all 3,007 ITLs) that are subsequently traded on the secondary market. The observation is loan-trade year for bid-ask spread as a loan can be traded in multiple years. In all panels, we report the differences of the mean values in the last column. *, **, and *** indicate a 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance for a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variance. The variable names are self-explanatory, and see detailed variable definitions in Table 1 . . , B, C, D, E., etc.) and those being labeled simply as "term loan" with "bullet" payment schedules.
The key independent variable in all columns is CL Indicator, which equals to one for a bundled ITL and zero for a stand-alone ITL. We include the firm (borrower) and year fixed effects in Column (1), and the firm-by-year fixed effects from Columns (2) to (4). In Column (4), the lead bank fixed effects are also added. In Column (5), we include bank-by-year fixed effects. Loan purpose fixed effects are included in all models. The sample used in Column (1) contains 3,007 ITLs. The samples used in Columns (2) to (5) contain subsamples of the 3,007 ITLs that correspond to the usage of different fixed effects. Note that borrowing firm characteristics, which are measured annually, drop out in Columns (2) to (4) because of the inclusion of the firm-by-year fixed effects. Bank characteristics drop out in Column (5) because of the inclusion of the bank-by-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and tstatistics are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Regressions in this table examine how the impact of a credit line on ITL interest spread varies with different information problems due to borrower information opacity and the lead bank information production efficiency. The dependent variable in all columns is Log (All-in-Drawn Spread) of ITLs. ITLs include term loans below A (i.e., B, C, D, E., etc.) and those being labeled simply as "term loan" with "bullet" payment schedules. The key independent variable in all columns is CL Indicator*Info Problem Proxy. CL Indicator equals to one for a bundled ITL and zero for a standalone ITL. Info Problem Proxy is indicated by the column title. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) include the firm and year fixed effects. Columns (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10) include the firm-by-year fixed effects. All models include loan purpose fixed effects. The samples used in Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) contain 3,007 ITLs. The samples used in Columns (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10) contain subsamples of 3,007 ITLs corresponding to the usage of the firm-by-year fixed effects. For brevity, only coefficients and t-statistics (in parenthesis) of the key independent variables are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. . , B, C, D, E., etc.) and those being labeled simply as "term loan" with "bullet" payment schedules. In Columns (1) to (6), the dependent variable is Log (All-in-Drawn Spread) .
In Column (1), we include two additional loan characteristics control variables: Sponsored Loan (=1 if a loan is sponsored; =0 otherwise), Refinance Loan (=1 if a loan is a refinancing loan; =0 otherwise). In Column (2), we include an additional control variable: TLA Indicator (=1 if there is also a Term Loan A in the same package of an ITL; =0 otherwise). In Column (3), we include an additional control variable: Existing Loan Indicator (=1 if the borrower also has a loan that was issued before but still outstanding from the same lead bank of the ITL when the ITL is originated; =0 otherwise). In Column (4), the sample is all non-bank term loans (including ITLs and other non-bank term loans with no specific ranking). In Column (5), the sample contains all borrowers including those that are not in Compustat. In Column (6), the independent variable is the portion of credit line in a package ($ amount). In Column (7), the dependent variable is All-in-Drawn Spread in basis points above LIBOR. All models include the firm-by-year fixed effects and the loan purpose fixed effects. For brevity, only coefficients and t-statistics (in parenthesis) of the key independent variables are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. . , B, C, D, E., etc.) and those being labeled simply as "term loan" with "bullet" payment schedules. In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is Log (Time-On-Market) (Log (TOM)). In Columns (3) to (6), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if an ITL is traded in the secondary market and is equal to 0 otherwise. Columns (3) to (5) estimate Logit models. Column (6) estimates a linear probability model. All columns except Column (5) include the firm-by-year fixed effects and the loan purpose fixed effects. The sample size in Columns (3) and (4) drops because Logit estimation drops an observation when the inclusion of the fixed effects perfectly predicts the outcome in the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. . , B, C, D, E., etc.) and those being labeled simply as "term loan" with "bullet" payment schedules. The dependent variable in Column (4) is the Monthly Average Bid-Ask Spread of traded ITLs. The key independent variable in all columns is CL Indicator, which is equal to one if there is a credit line in the package of the ITL and zero otherwise. The sample used in all columns (expect in Column (4)) contains loan-trading year combinations of traded ITLs. Column (3) uses a subsample of the first loan-trading year combinations after loan inception of traded ITLs. The sample used in Column (4) contains loan-trading month combinations of traded ITLs. Column (1) reports the firm and year fixed effects model estimation results. Columns (1) to (3) use the firm-by-year fixed effects. Column (4) uses the firm-by-month fixed effects. Column (5) use the firm-by-year fixed effects and lead bank fixed effects. Column (6) use the bank-by-year fixed effects. All models include the loan purpose fixed effects. In Column (6), the lead bank characteristics drop because of the bank-by-year fixed effects. For brevity, coefficient estimates of borrower characteristics are not reported in Column (6). Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (1) and (2) report results using borrower industry fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) report results using firm fixed effects. Columns (5) and (6) report firm fixed effects estimation results using a matched subsample from a 3-nearest neighbors propensity score matching (PSM). All columns include year and loan purpose fixed effects. For brevity, only coefficients and t-statistics on the key independent variables are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
